《教育中的哲学探究》（Philosophical Inquiry in Education），第27卷（2020年），第2期，第122—134页。从疑病症到断裂：黑格尔与斯蒂格勒论青年。乔夫·P.N. 布拉德利，日本东京帝京大学（Teikyo University）。「人人都将被无产化……我认为今天教育遭到摧毁，不仅是在大学或学校里，而且是在家庭之中。例如，智能手机就摧毁了教育；使用智能手机的父母不去看婴儿或孩子。今天，整个社会普遍地被社交网络、被数字技术所摧毁。我这样说，是因为如果我们需要受教育，那是因为我们是十分奇特的动物。我们的主要器官不在我们的身体之内，而在身体之外……正因为如此，人必须受教育，因为他总是要学习如何使用人造器官，即语言、社会规则、宗教、仪式，还有计算机、播客，等等，等等。如果我们理解教育必须建立在这一过程之上，我们就必须彻底重新定义什么是教育。」（Stiegler & Gagliano, 2019）考虑到上面这段引文中，贝尔纳尔·斯蒂格勒（亦见 Stiegler, Nancy, & Jugnon, 2016）讨论了数字技术对社会结构所释放的、被感知到的灾难性后果，那么，我们在何种意义上可以把今天的青年所经历的根本性技术断裂，同格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔（G. W. F. Hegel, 1770–1831）青年时期所患的自我诊断的疑病（hypochondriasis）或疑病症（hypochondria）相提并论、建立关联？[1] 乍看之下，这是一个奇怪而不合常规的问题，但尽管如此，它依然重要、发人深省，而且确实切合时宜，因为它关乎对知识本身的求索。此外，这两位思想家的比较是有助益的，因为它以一种新的方式探讨了如下问题：1）知识究竟是什么？2）教化（Bildung，自由教育或文化）的形成具有何种性质？我断言，这两个问题都触及两位思想家共同的主题与核心议题。
Philosophical Inquiry in Education, Volume 27 (2020), No. 2, pp. 122-134 From Hypochondria to Disruption: Hegel and Stiegler on Youth JOFF P.N. BRADLEY Teikyo University, Tokyo, Japan Everybody will be proletarianized… I think that today education is destroyed not only in the university or in school, but in the family. It is destroyed for example by the smartphone; parents who use a smartphone don't look at the babies or the children. Today, society in general is destroyed by social networking, by digital technologies. I say that because if we need to be e ducated, it is because we are very strange animals. Our main organs are not into our body but outside of the body… This is the reason for which the human being must be educated because he has always to learn how to use artificial organs, that is language, social rules, religion, rituals but also computers, podcasting, et cetera, et cetera. If we understand that education must be based on this process, we have to completely redefine what is education. (Stiegler & Gagliano, 2019) Considering the quotation above in which Bernard Stiegler (see also Stiegler, Nancy, & Jugnon, 2016) discusses the perceived catastrophic effects unleashed by digital technologies upon societal structures, in what sense can we grant the fundamental technological disruption experienced by the youth of today a proximity and relationship to the self-diagnosed hypochondriasis or hypochondria suffered by G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) in his youth?1 At first glance, this question is a strange and unconventional one but, nonetheless, it is important and thought -provoking and, indeed, timely, as it informs the struggle for knowledge as such. Moreover, the comparison between the two thinkers is helpful as it explores in a new way the following questions:
这些问题也有助于阐明危机（κρῐ́σῐς；古希腊语中的 Krisis 意为决断或判断）的意义，既包括黑格尔个人的危机与哲学危机，也包括当代数字时代青年在心理与社会意义上的危机（Stiegler 2010; 2017）。尽管语境不同、哲学传统不同，黑格尔与斯蒂格勒都提供了一种青年哲学、一种年龄哲学、一种精神哲学，并因此照亮了对意识存在（Bewusst-sein，conscious being）之发展中所发现的危机的某种特定回应。二者都是讨论当代青年的磨难与困苦时不可或缺的思想家。有鉴于此，本文在青年黑格尔之疑病症——一种普遍的忧郁或焦虑——的那种空洞主体性，与当代青年自身的欲望断裂之间作一比较；当代青年不仅面对气候变化与人类世（Anthropocene）的严酷现实，还面对机器人化、教育机构的瓦解以及劳动力持续的去技能化，因而再也无法设想一个未来。[1] 罗森茨维格在黑格尔后期讲座中发现了一种「年龄哲学」（Philosophie der Lebensalter）。黑格尔的自我分析回望了其生命大约第二十七年、即所谓的法兰克福时期所出现的某种「空洞主体性」或「疑病症」。这就是黑格尔与疑病症的「斗争」（Kampf）及其克服。参见 Rosenzweig, F. (1982). Hegel und der Staat. Aalen: Scientia Verlag. 参见 Kaufmann, W. (1978). Hegel: A reinterpretation. University of Notre Dame Press; Hegel, G. W. F., Butler, C., & Seiler, C. (1984). Hegel, the letters. Indiana University Press. 问题是：黑格尔的疑病症在何种意义上能够与弗洛里安（Florian）的虚无主义与异化相提并论？弗洛里安是《断裂时代》（Dans la disruption, The Age of Disruption, 2016）中的青少年，斯蒂格勒描述他患有一种对未来的深刻信念丧失。
The questions also serve to inform the meaning of crisis (κρῐ́σῐς, Krisis in ancient Greek means decision or judgment), both in terms of the personal crisis and philosophical crisis of Hegel, as well as the psychical and societal sense of crisis among youth in the contemporary digital age (Stiegler 2010; 2017). Despite their different contexts and different philosophical traditions, Hegel and Stiegler both offer a philosophy of youth , a philos ophy of age , a philosophy of spirit, and because of this illuminate a particular response to the crisis found in the development of Bewusst-sein or conscious being. Both are vital thinkers for discussing the trials and tribulations of contemporary youth. With this in mind, a comparison is made between the empty subjectivity of young Hegel’s hypochondria –a general 1 Rosenzweig finds a “philosophy of age” (Philosophie der Lebensalter) in Hegel’s later lectures. Hegel’s self- analysis looks back on a certain “empty subjectivity” or “hypochondria” around the 27th year of life, the so-called Frankfurt period. This is Hegel’s “fight” ( Kampf) with and overcoming of hypochondria. See Rosenzweig, F. (1982). Hegel und der Staat . Aalen: Scientia Verlag. See Kaufmann, W. (1978). Hegel: A reinterpretation. University of Notre Dame Press; Hegel, G. W. F., Butler, C., & Seiler, C. (1984). Hegel, the letters. Indiana University Press. melancholy or anxiety–and the very disruption of desire itself among contemporary youth who, in facing not only the stark realities of climate change and the Anthropocene, but also robotization, the breakdown of educational institutions and the ongoing deskilling of the workforce, can no longer envisage a future. The question is: in what sense is Hegel’s hypochondria comparable in any way to the nihilism and al
ienation of Florian, the teenager in Dans la disruption [The Age of Disruption ] (2016), who Stiegler describes as suffering from a profound loss of belief in the future?
结论部分思忖：当前的技术时代是否已经扭曲了个体化（individuation，即主体自身的生成过程，一个源自吉尔伯特·西蒙东〔Gilbert Simondon〕的概念）过程，以致通过种种青年疑病症或异化形式而实现的心理必经之路，已经被一种全然不同的文化化或教化模式（一种自动化模式，或安托瓦内特·鲁夫鲁瓦〔Antoinette Rouvroy〕所谓的「算法治理术」〔algorithmic governmentality〕（2013））所取代。任何对上述难题的回答，都必须把黑格尔深沉的疑病症——他的生存危机——理解为对如下两方面的回应：一是历史时刻（法国大革命、现代世界中的政治、对绝对知识之不可能性的考量），二是从青年时期开始、一路跋涉走向知识的个人智识旅程。黑格尔把这一历程视为教化（Bildung），即人如何成为一个有教养的道德存在者。对这一概念的进一步探讨，将有助于限定和理解其不同的精神分析学的、哲学的、生存论的、药理学的（pharmacological）意涵，以及诸如此类的失调症：自闭症、创伤、歇斯底里、精神分裂、Zerrissenheit（彻底的支离破碎）、偏执狂、忧郁症与异化，还有那显然是新的病症——断裂，即前所未有的技术变革——斯蒂格勒对此特别加以关注。换言之，似乎有必要考察并正视正在发生的、改写疑病症、歇斯底里、Zerrissenheit 与精神分裂之意义的时代差异，另一方面，也有必要考察当下此刻的断裂感。黑格尔以一种阴郁的明快呈现人的生命。「从出生的黎明到永恒的黑夜，先是儿童，然后是充满观念与计划的青年，让位于成熟却幻灭、被社会义务所驯服的成年男子，最后是精疲力竭、语无伦次的老人。」（Malabou, 2009, p. 24）我们能赋予黑格尔所探讨的生命诸年龄的自然进程以何种新意义？
The conclusion speculates on whether the current technological era has distorted the process of individuation (the becoming of itself of the subject, a concept derived from Gilbert Simondon) to such an extent that the necessity of psychological passage through forms of youthful hypochondria or alienation has been superseded by an altogether different mode of enculturation or inculcation (a mode of automatization or what Antoinette Rouvroy calls “algorithmic governmentality” (2013)). Any answer to the abo ve set of conundra must understand Hegel’s profound hypochondria–his existential crisis–in terms of a response to both the historical moment (the French revolution, politics in the modem world , the consideration of the impossibility of absolute knowledge ) and the personal intellectual journey that begins in youth and sojourns its way towards knowledge. This passage is seen by Hegel in terms of Bildung, or how one becomes an educated moral being. Further exploration of this concept will help to qualify and understand its different psychoanalytical, philosophical, existential, pharmacological senses, as well as the array of disorders such as autism, trauma, hysteria, schizophrenia, Zerrissenheit or utter dismemberment, paranoia, melancholia and alienation and the apparently new malady - disruption or unprecedented technological change – which is singled out for particular attention by Stiegler. In other words, it seems essential to examine and confront the epochal differences taking place which are rewriting the meaning of hypochondria, hysteria, Zerrissenheit and schizophrenia, on the one hand, and, on the other, the sense of disruption in the present moment. Hypochondria Hegel presents human life with a sombre briskness. From the dawn of birth to the eternal night, fi
rst the child, then the youth full of ideas and projects, give way to the mature man ripe but disenchanted, broken in by social obligations, finally to the ol d man exhausted and driveling. (Malabou, 2009, p. 24) What new meaning can we give to the natural course of the ages of life as explored by Hegel?
哲学家凯瑟琳·马拉布（Catherine Malabou）在上文所勾勒的这一生命历程，是如何被技术性的时代变迁所打断的？当我们把斯蒂格勒在代际之间的跨个体化回路（即父母与子女之间、教师与学生之间的回路）中所辨认出的断裂感与之相比时，我们能赋予黑格尔青年时期的疑病症以及年龄哲学的问题以何种意义？这就是要理解个体化的过程（即主体性如何形成）以及跨个体化的过程（即主体性如何以主体间的方式形成）。在此有必要追问：年龄哲学对于教育哲学具有何种意义与重要性？带着这些问题，并作几项保留说明，本文并非打算直接为关于黑格尔与疯癫的大量学术研究添砖加瓦。我们也不打算考察忧郁与浪漫主义悲观主义在文艺复兴和启蒙运动思想中所扮演的关键角色，例如拜伦勋爵（Lord Byron）所遭受的那种 Zerrissenheit 之感（Hentschel, 2018），或哥特式的 Zerrissenheit 之感（Mulvey, 2009）。毋宁说，本文的中心主题关乎欧洲两个不同时代中的青年危机及其看似不可通约的比较，即黑格尔的青年时代，与斯蒂格勒所关注的21世纪最初几十年的青年时代。因此，尽管详细探讨黑格尔卷帙浩繁的著作及其对青年的沉思——它们见于他的几部关键著作，即《法哲学原理》（Philosophy of Right）、《哲学科学百科全书》（Encyclopaedia）以及《精神现象学》（Phenomenology of Spirit）的哲学之美中——超出了本文的范围，但我们的努力将局限于如下问题：他个人的疑病症、对知识丧失的生存论关切、教化的危机，以及这一切如何共同构成对我们时代根本性技术断裂之体验的认知。带着上述保留，让我们简要考察青年黑格尔的抑郁与疑病症，以理解其背后的理由与原因。
How has this passage of life, as outlined by philosopher Catherine Malabou above, been disrupted by technologically-inflected epochal changes? What meaning can we give to the hypochondria in Hegel’s youth and the question of the philosophy of age when we compare the sense of disruption Stiegler discerns in the transindividuation circuits between the generations, that is, circuits between parent and child, teacher and student ? This is to understand the process of individuation (or how subjectivity is formed) and the process of transindividuation (or how subjectivity is formed intersubjectively). Here it is important to ask: What is the meaning and significance of the philosophy of age for the philosophy of education? With these questions in mind, and adding several caveats, this essay is not penned as a direct contribution to the considerable scholarship on Hegel and madness. Nor shall we investigate the key roles melancholy and romantic pessimism played in the thinking of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, for example, the sense of Zerrissenheit suffered by Lord Byron (Hentschel, 2018) or the sense of Gothic Zerrissenheit (Mulvey, 2009). Rather the essay’s central theme regards the crisis of youth in two different ages of Europe, and their seemingly incommensurable comparison, namely the time of Hegel’ s youth and the time of youth in the early decades of the 21st century which is Stiegler’s concern . Therefore, while it is outside the scope of this essay to explore in detail Hegel's extensive oeuvre and his rumination on youth, which is found in several of his key works–namely the Philosophy of Right, the Encyclopaedia and in the philosophical beauty of the Phenomenology of Spirit–our endeavour shall limit itself to the question of his personal hypochondria, the exist
ential concern with the loss of knowledge, the crisis of Bildung, and how this may together inform the experience of the fundamental technological disruption of our epoch. With the above provisos in mind, let us examine briefly the young Hegel’s depression and hypochondria to understand their underlying reasons and causes.
亚历山大·科耶夫（Alexandre Kojève）写道，黑格尔在大约二十七岁时明白了「人必须克服某种疑病症」。就黑格尔而言，疑病症的显现源于对历史的深刻理解。他在二十多岁后期和三十岁出头所经历的深刻而持久的抑郁期严重到「使他的一切能力瘫痪」，换言之，使他的计划与目标受挫。这通常被称为法兰克福时期。在这一时期，无论在哲学上还是个人生活中，黑格尔都竭力调和（青年时期）对个体性的弃绝与绝对知识的观念。Zerrissenheit，即被撕成碎片的状态（torn-to-pieces-hood），是死亡施加于精神的效应或界限，科耶夫解释说，黑格尔逐渐认识到，哲学必须通过在精神自身的运动与历程中内化疯癫与死亡来完成自身。对此绝无逃遁之途。正是在克服疑病症的过程中，黑格尔本质上成为一位智者（Wise Man）；他把不信任的青年与老年的智慧调和起来。经历了这样一场危机之后，黑格尔出版了《科学体系第一部》，题为「精神现象学科学」，并宣称大地上将再也不会有任何新事物（Kojève & Queneau, 1969, p. 168）。在1810年5月27日致温迪施曼（Windischmann）的一封信中，黑格尔把他的生活描述为处于「黑暗地带」，并暗示唯有献身于「科学」才能治愈它（Kaufman, 1978, pp. 328-329）。信中写道：「从我的亲身经验中，我了解这种灵魂、或者毋宁说理性的心境；当理性终于带着兴趣和预感摸索着进入现象的混沌之中，却虽然在内心里确信目标，尚未能穿过现象抵达清晰、抵达对整体的详尽说明时，这种心境便会出现。有几年我曾患这种疑病症，直至精疲力竭。每个人大概都有他生命中的这样一个转折点，即其本质收缩的黑暗之夜，在这黑夜中他被逼穿过一道狭窄的通道，而他对自身和日常生活的信心由此变得愈发坚强而笃定……满怀信心地继续前行吧。」
Alexandre Kojève writes that Hegel, at about the age of 27, understands that “a man has to conquer a certain hypochondria.” In Hegel’s case, the hypochondria manifests because of a profound understanding of history. The period of deep and lasting depression in his late 20s and early 30s was so severe as “to paralyze all his powers ,” in other words, to frustrate his projects and goals. This is usually referred to as the Frankfurt period. At this time, philosophically and personally, Hegel struggled to reconcile the abandonment of Individuality (in youth) with the idea of absolute knowledge. Zerrissenheit, or torn-to-pieces-hood, is the effect or limit of death on spirit, and Kojève explains that Hegel came to understand that philosophy must complete itself by interiorizing madness and death in the very movement and passage of spirit. There is simply no escape from this. It is in the surmounting of hypochondria that Hegel essentially becomes a Wise Man ; he reconciles a distrusting youth with the wisdom of old age. After such a crisis, Hegel publishes the First Part of the System of Science entitled 'Science of the Phenomenology of the Spirit' and declares there will never more be anything new on earth (Kojève & Queneau, 1969, p. 168). In a letter written May 27, 1810 to Windischmann, Hegel describes his life in the “dark regions” and suggests that only devotion to “science” can cure it (Kaufman, 1978, pp. 328-329). The letter reads: From my own experience I know this mood of the soul, or rather of reason, which arises when it has finally made its wa y with interest and hunches into a chaos of phenomena but, though inwardly certain of the goal, has not yet worked its way through them to clarity and to a detailed account of the whole. For a few years I suffered from this
hypochondria to the point of exh austion. Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence in which he is forced through a narrow passage by which his confidence in himself and everyda y life grows in strength and assurance … Continue onward with confidence.
是科学把你引入了灵魂的这一迷宫，也只有科学才能把你带出迷宫并治愈你。（Hegel, Butler, & Seiler, 1984, p. 559）同年晚些时候，在一封日期为1810年12月14日的信中，黑格尔以一种彻底的苦涩来描述人的生命（Kaufman, 1978, p. 175）。这种苦涩也反映在《精神现象学》（The Phenomenology of Spirit）中题为「自我异化了的精神。教养：教养及其现实领域」一节里，黑格尔在那里把自我理解描述为：那意识到自己的撕裂并公开宣告这种撕裂的意识，嘲笑着实存与普遍的混乱，也嘲笑着它自身；它同时是这一切混乱的渐渐消逝却仍可听闻的回响。（Hegel, Miller, & Findlay, 1977, p. 319）这种力图理解世界的挣扎，与斯蒂格勒所说的那个拒绝未来的15岁男孩弗洛里安（Florian）有什么关系？斯蒂格勒声称，弗洛里安属于21世纪头十年中的一代人，这一代人不再梦想，或不敢梦想。弗洛里安认为自己属于最后一代人——一个没有方向、士气低落、盲目的一代，一个陷于集体混乱、饱受深刻痛苦与失范（anomie）之苦的一代。在《断裂》（Dans la Disruption）中，斯蒂格勒认为有必要回应弗洛里安的危机，弗洛里安被引述说：你们根本不把我们遭遇的事当回事。当我与我这一代的年轻人交谈时，那些与我年龄相仿、只差两三岁的人，他们说的都一样：我们不再有组建家庭、生儿育女、学一门手艺或怀抱理想的梦想，就像你们自己十几岁时那样。这一切都完了，都结束了，因为我们确信我们将是最后一代人，或是终结之前最后几代人中的一代。（Stiegler, 2018, p. 233）希望的丧失似乎是更广泛的社会弊病的症候，因此，斯蒂格勒关注的是欲望丧失的原因，以及随之而来的冲动以暴力和反社会行为方式发泄出来的相应风险（Stiegler, 2009）。
It is science which has led you into this labyrinth of the soul, and science alone is capable of leadin g you out again and healing you . (Hegel, Butler, & Seiler, 1984, p. 559) Later that year in a letter dated December 14, 1810, Hegel describes human life with a perfect bitterness (Kaufman, 1978, p. 175). This is reflected elsewhere in the section of The Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ‘Self-alienated Spirit. Culture: Culture a nd its Sphere of Realty’ where Hegel describes self- understanding as: The consciousness that is aware of its disruption and openly declares it, derides existence and the universal confusion, and derides its own self as well; it is at the same time the fading, but still audible, sound of all this confusion. (Hegel, Miller, & Findlay, 1977, p. 319) What has this struggle to make sense of the world to do with Florian, the young boy of 15 who Stiegler speaks of as rejecting the future? Stiegler claims Florian is of a generation in the first decade of the 21st century that does not or dare not dream. Florian thinks he belongs to the last generation, a directionless, demoralized blind generation, a generation in collective disarray, suffering a profound sense of distress and anomie. In Dans la Disruption, Stiegler finds it necessary to respond to the crisis of Florian who is quoted as saying: You really take no account of what happens to us. When I talk to young people of my generation, those within two or three years of my own age, they all say the same thing: we no longer have the dream of starting a family, of having children, or a trade, or ideals, as you yourselves did when you were teenagers. All that is over and done with, because we ’re sure that we will be the last generation, or one of the last, before the end. (Stiegler, 2018, p. 233) Th
e loss of hope appears symptomatic of wider social ills and, as such, Stiegler is concerned with the reasons for the loss of desire and the corresponding risks which ensue in the acting out of the drives in violence and asocial behavior (Stiegler, 2009).
他关注青年的困境、青年自杀、如今已在更广大地区出现的日本蛰居（hikikomori）即社交隐退综合征现象，以及易受恐怖主义和各种其他恶性社会赘生物影响的一代青年。斯蒂格勒关注的是丧失了「存在之感」的青年的存在性绝望（Selve & Stiegler, 2019）。对他来说，这是一种污秽（immonde）之境，一种无语状态（见 Bradley, 2020）。他发现这种状态表现为中国和日本普遍存在的抑郁——他说这两国精神疾病要严重得多。在《休克状态》（States of Shock）中，斯蒂格勒写到了青年对未来以及对前几代人的怀疑：青年方面的这种怀疑，即「后代」一代对其「前辈」的不承认——前辈由此失去了其权威地位——不幸地超越了纯理论性和学术性的知识形式：同样被褫夺信誉的，也是（原则上代代相传的）生活方式，而且或许首先是这些生活方式。就此而言，受到挑战的正是各种形式的教育，因为教育就其一般意义而言正是这种代际传承，它远远超出学校教学的范围，在其中，年长者——教师、父母、祖父母——原则上就是各种知识形式的代表，他们从中找到并汲取自己的权威。（2015, p. 21）如我们所见，黑格尔声称所有人都可能必须经历生命中的一个转折点：「其本质收缩的夜间之点」（Hegel, Butler, & Seiler, 1984, p. 559）。是科学，也唯有科学，在把人引入「心灵迷宫」之后，能够把人带出迷宫；因此，可以追随斯蒂格勒说，科学具有一种深刻的药理学（pharmacological）和治疗性效果：它既提供毒药也提供解药，既是崩溃也是突破。斯蒂格勒在这里的插话，是要凸显知识的无产化（proletarianization）与学习的去精神化（de-noetization）——这两者若被搬回黑格尔的时代，将使对科学的追求陷入危机。
He is concerned with the plight of youth, with youth suicide, the phenomena of hikikomori or social recluse syndrome in Japan which is now witnessed wider afield, with a generation of youth susceptible to terrorism and all manner of other malignant social outgrowths. Stiegler is concerned with the existential despair of youth which has lost “the sensation of existing” (Selve & Stiegler, 2019). This for him is a situation of immonde, of wordlessness (see Bradley, 2020). This he finds expressed in widespread depression in China and in Japan where he says mental illness is much graver. In States of Shock , Stiegler writes of the scepticism of youth both towards the future and towards the former generations: This scepticism on the part of youth, this non -recognition by the ‘descendant’ generation in relation to its ‘ascendance’, which thus loses its ascend ancy, unfortunately extends past merely the theoretical and scholarly forms of knowledge: it is also and perhaps primarily ways of life (which are in principle transmitted from one generation to another) that have been discredited. As such, it is education in all its forms that is being challenged, given that education in general is this intergenerational transmission, well beyond school teaching, wherein those who are older – teachers, parents, grandparents – are in principle the representatives of the dif ferent forms of knowledge through which they find and from which they draw their authority. (2015, p. 21) As we have seen, Hegel claims all humans may have to endure a turning point in life: “the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence” (Hegel, Butler, & Seiler, 1984, p. 559) . It is science and science alone which, upon leading one into the “labyrinth of the mind,” is capable of leading one out and, therefo