把契约规定为一种关系，意味着公共与特殊个体之间、或臣民与主权者之间的关系。但人民、公共并不先于契约而存在；卢梭这一表述只是临时性的，并非最深刻的。无论如何，我们始终在处理三个词项：特殊者（个体或私人）、臣民、公民。这些词项相互递归。一种情形中，中项是被视为处于两种关系中的个体：作为臣民与作为主权者的成员。另一种情形中，中项是作为臣民、并处于两种关系中被审视者。于是可以说，契约在一种关系下把特殊个体构成为臣民、在另一关系下构成为公民。或者，臣民被当作相对于主权者的特殊个体、以及相对于特殊个体的主权者之成员。故契约使三个相互递归的词项介入；中项须被置于两种关系中。第一假说中，个体是中项：它相对于主权者把自己构成为臣民，相对于特殊个体把自己构成为主权者的成员。最终，只有臣民具有双重关系：一者对主权者，再者作为主权者的成员。故臣民是中项。契约的基本行为是：个体使自己成为臣民、同时成为主权者的成员（否则他便是一个奴隶）。于是《社会契约论》有三种公式，一个比一个深刻：a) 两词项间的关系；b) 三个词项的发现；c) 臣民本身被置于两种关系中被看待。

, lo sujot cs c pris ccL:ne .-:rti culi0r ,gar rapport m u souverain, at co :::_e nonbre du souverain par rapport au particulier, L ltindivi- du. Lo contrat fait done intorvenir 3 terr.:es r^ciprocables : le noyen terr,o doit "trc k ris sous deux map,ports. DL:;L''. :; - LT. - 22 - Dans la ,;roLli ru hypoth6so, c' est 1' in,'.ividu qui est uoyon terme. I1 so constituo aujot par rapport au souverain. I1 so constitu co:.'s_e ::1C 1Lro C u souverain par rapport aux i Llrticu- liurs . FinalcL:ont, soul 1: ir-ieo' a double rapport : au souverain 'abord of Jo plus it cot J ;i_bre du souvo: ain. C' ost ^.cnc lui is uoycn tcrne. L'acto Cu ',aso Cu .;;ntrat, c' ost l' ac', par l:,ucl l' inC_ividu se fait sujet t on ^; 'u-:---'s L1oulbre Ou solivvrain (°inon it serait esclavo). I1 y a 3 for__ulus Cu Contrr.t social, Co I.,11-.s on plus profon^lr^s. Le Contrat est r::lation ontr.; C'oux tcr-acs CQ"couvurto Cc tro,is tce:-.es cost le sujot lui-1-.:e qui ost pris sous Ceux rapports. bvec is Contrat nalt unu obli,- ration. Qui ost obliE;6 ? ( chapitre VII, libre I) . Cu n'ust -as 1'inCividu, car juridiquov . ent l'individu no paut s' obli.:r lui- :pt_o . Est-co lo souverain ? Non, car le souverain nest sounis h rien d'autre qr. 'L sa condition C'e::istunce : lCos lois qui dcteruinent los conCitions son Otre . :In lui •-.m ie , it no peut 8tre oblig6 a rien . "Violer 1'actc par luquel le souverain existe , serait s'an6an- tir" cha pitre VII. Soul l o suiot est sou :his l'obligation . I1 n'y a que lui qui pout titre saisi sous C_eux rapports , ce qui est la condition de l'obliga- tion. Queue est la source de l'obligation ? C'est le"libre onE;ageuent de colui qui s'obliCe". Lottre 6 de la Piontagne. Le torus qui est ca pable do s'obliLer no peut titre quo le sujet. De toutes los sourcos d'obligations , on peut C'_iscuter , sauf de celle-la. Nature Co cot acto _'en;,ag*

To posit the contract as a relation signifies a relation between public and particular individual, or between subject and sovereign. But the people, the public, do not pre -exist the contract. This expression by Rousseau is only provisionary and is not the most profound one 34. Yet in any case, we are constantly dealing with three terms: the particular (the individual or private 33 Social Contract book III. 34 Social Contract b ook II, chapter IV , 2nd paragraph, note where Rousseau insists on the difficulty of precisely defining the terms. man), the subject, and the citizen. These terms are reciprocal35. In one case, the middle term is the individual considered under two relations: as subject and as member of the sovereign. In another, it is the subject which is the middle term and envisaged under two relations.

So it will be said that the contract constitutes the particular individual as subject under one relation and as citizen under another. Or else, the subject is taken as particular individual in relation to the sovereign, and as member of the sovereign in relation to the particular individual, in the individual. The contract thus makes three reciprocal terms intervene: the middle term must be taken under two relations. In the first hypothesis, the individual is the middle term. It constitutes itself as subject in relation to the sovereign, and as member of the sovereign in relation to particular individuals. So in the end, only the subject has a double relation: first to the sovereign and furthermore, as member of the sovereign. So the subject is the middle term. The basic act of the contract is the act by which the individual makes itself subject and at the same time member of the sovereign (otherwise he would be a slave). There are thus three formulas to the Social contract, each more profound than the other: a) a relation between two terms; b) a discovery of three terms; c) it is the subject itself which is taken under two relations.

义务随契约而生。谁被约束？不是个体，因为法律上个体不能约束自己。是主权者吗？不是，因为主权者除其存在条件——规定其存在之条件的法——外不臣服于任何东西；在自身中他不能被约束：「违背使主权者存在的那一行为，将是自我消灭」。惟有臣民屈从于义务；惟有他能在两种关系下被把握，而这正是义务的条件。义务的来源是什么？是「自我约束者之自由的同意」。能够约束的词语只能是臣民；一切义务之源皆可讨论，惟此例外。这一约定行为有两特征：总体性（totalité）与瞬时性（instantanéité）。行为须是全部的让渡：就覆盖一切而言它是完全的，就每个个体被完全让渡而言它是普遍的。这让渡可以是完全的，因为它并非为让他人获益而施行；若不然，让渡便非总体，因为自由不可让渡。让渡在于构成一个全体，而非使自己依附他人。故每个个体屈从于同一条件：「各人完全献出自己，条件对一切平等」。不会因个体让渡之多寡而生差异（除非并非人人全然让渡、除非有人保留什么）。在全部让渡的层面上，平等已然包含其中。行为也是瞬时的：「联合即刻产生一个道德与政治的身体」。从我让渡自己那一刻起，我同时构成了主权者并收回一切；不可能另有他样。主权者把一切、甚至更多，以另一种形式归还于我。例如：主权者保障个体从自身让渡出去的财产的合法占有；它只保留共同体所需者。这里并无主权者的道德义务，那是其存在之条件；若它不实现这归还，便自我摧毁。惟有主权者能言说共同利益：「必须承认惟有主权者是此类重要性之裁判」——它随情势、环境、社会之形态而极为变动。作为对所有者这局部归还的交换，将有征税。所有者不过是公共善的保管者；他惟有通过主权者的归还行为才作为所有者存在。这即刻的归还关乎私有财产与私人意见，亦即私人宗教，它不关乎臣民。

e-ent:itaCeuxcaracteres:latotalit6etl'instantan6it6.Cf.L.IChapitruVI.Cotactooatunealienationtotale.-Totalo,c'est-a-dire.coLlpltto:elleportesurtout.universelle:chaqucindividus'alieneconpletenent.Lli6nationqui,pout8trecoupleted'unautre.Sielle1'était,ellelalibort6estinalienable.L'ali6nationconsisteconstituerd'autrui.D'ouc.iaqueindividuest"ChacunsoConnanttoutenti-:r,laL.IChapitroVI.I1n'yauraitCosCiff6ro_cespa_rcequ'ellenestpasauprofitnopourraite5tretotalepuisqueuntout,nonasefaired6pendantsounisalangnecondition.conditionosttgalepourtolls"ontrolosindividusquiounoins,quosichacunno:,'ali&;naitpastotalepent,s'itconser-vaitquelquochose.iunivuauCo1'ali;;nationtotaloestC6jc_comprise1'6galit6.alienontplusDL;L.,UZ,'23-instantnneit':L.ICLr.pitroVI."L1'instant,1'associationproduituncorpsLoralut,.olitique".Do1'instantulaeofju:aline,ainfoisjeconstituelesouve-rainofj:;rucul)erotout.Ilnopouton8tronutrencnt.LesouverainruerestituetoutatuOneplus,sousuneautreforne."ChapitreIX,L.I.Losouvorainassure,:nrexamplein16r-itinepossessiondeinpropriétéquo1'individuluiaali;3neo.I1n'engardequecequiestncossairoainconuunnute.I1n'yalenslaobligationmoraledusouverain.C'ustunoconditiondasonelistence.S'iln'effectuepascottc;restitution,itostc.„truit.'4laisitfautcc;nvoiLirquolosouv::rninsoulestjuE;edecotteimpor-tance".SoullosouverainpoutBirococluiostd'intere^tconnun.Cequiosttr::svariablescioninsituation,loscirconstances,innor-pholo.;iod'un:;soci(t:.Incontre-.)crtiec'ocattorostitutiar.lnrtiolleauxproprietaires,ityauralovc:o;'.Iuni:pot.Leproprietniron'ustquedepositairoc'ubionpublic.I1n'existecounaproprietairoquoparfactoCcrestitutiondusouverain.LarestitutioninneuiatoPortesurinDroprictepriv6eat11opinionprivc;e,c'est-direinrelif;ionprivcequin'intoressepaslesu-jet.(dorniorchnpitreduContrat).Pourquoilusouverainconstitue-t-ilunovolont6;6n6rale?Locontrastfornenocossairouentunevolonté,enerale.11nofautpasccnfonL.ro1'inter8t

connunetinvolontégenerale.L'interu^tconnun,c'estceluidusujetparrapportausouverain.Cequironvoiciunec:iateuentafactoparlequeljeneconstitueconnesujet:locontrat.Tousontunra.ieinter8tpuisqu'ilssontsounisauneconditionc:;;nle.Supprineri'egalitedetruittoutin-ter8tconnun.JonopouxmeconstituorCoUL_eunsujetqueparrapportaunsouve-raindentchaquesujetostc.onbre,parrapportauxindividus.Decepointdevue,chacunest16islateur.Cettefois,cen'estplus1'e-Galitoqu'ondeduit,naislaliberté,couuecequeveutlesouverainparrapport%uxindividus.Lavolontégencraleestinvolontédechacunentantqueneubredusouverain,cuecitoyen."Cequigeneraliseinvolont6,c'estl'int6r8tcot-.un".RueveutdireRousseau?L'inter8tconnunn'ostpasconstit

An obligation is born with the Cont ract. Who is obli ged 36? It is not the individual, because legally the individual cannot oblige itself. Is it the sovereign? No, because the sovereign is not submitted to anything except his condition of existence , to the laws which determine the conditions of his Being. In himself, he cannot be obliged to anything: “to violate the act by which the sovereign exists would be to annihilate itself”37. Only the subject is subjected to the 35 Social Contract book I, chapter VII. 36 Social Contract book I, chapter VII. 37 Social Contract book I, chapter VII. obligation. Only it can be grasped under the two relations, which is the condition of the obligation. What is the sourc e of the obligation? It is the ‘ free agreement of he who obliges himself’38. The term which is capable of obliging can only be the subject. All sources of obligations are up for discussions, except that one. This act of engagement has two characteristics, to with totality and instantaneity39. The act must be a total alienation, which is to say it is complete insofar as it covers everything, and universal insofar as each individual is completely alienated. This alienation can be complete, because it is not carried out for someone else to benefit from it. If that were to be the case, alienation would not be total, because freedom is inalienable. Alienation consists in constituting a whole, not in making oneself dependent on others.

Whence that each individual is subjected to the same condition: ‘each gives himself completely, the condition is equal for all’ 40. There will be no differences due to more or less alienation among individuals (unless of course not everyone alienates himself totally, unless someone conserves something). On the level of total alienation, equality is already included. The act is also instantaneous: ‘the association instantly produces a moral and political body’ 41. From the very moment I alienate myself, I at the same time constitute the sovereign and I recuperate everything. It cannot be otherwise. The sovereign restores everything to me and even more, just under another form 42. For example : the sovereign assures the legitimate possession of property which the individual has alienated from himself. He keeps only what is necessary for community. There is no moral obligation of the sovereign in this . It is a condition of his existence. If he does not effectuate this restitution, he is destroyed. Furthermore, only the sovereign can say that which is of common interest : ‘but it must be 38 Letter 6, Letters from the Mountain. 39 Social Contract book I, chapter VI. 40 Social Contract book I, chapter VI. 41 Social Contract book I, chapter VI. 42 Social Contract book I, chapter IX. admitted that only the sovereign is judge of such importance ’, of that which is very variable according the situation, the circumstances, the morphology of a society. In exchange for this partial restitution to owners, there will be a tax levy. The owner is but a repository of the public good. He only exists as owner by the sovereign’s act of restitution. The immediate restitution concerns private property and private opinion, that is to say private religion, which does not interest the subject43.

契约必然形成公意（volonté générale），但共同利益与公意不可混淆。共同利益是臣民相对于主权者的利益。随「我把自身构成为臣民」这一行为立即返回的，是契约。人人有相似利益，因为他们屈从于平等的条件。抽去平等便摧毁一切共同利益。我只能在相对于一主权者（臣民是其成员）关乎个体的关系中，把自己构成为臣民。由此观点，人人皆是立法者。这一次被推得的不是平等，而是自由——作为主权者关乎个体所欲者。公意是每个人作为主权者之成员、作为公民之意志。「共同利益使意志成为普遍的」。卢梭以此意谓什么？共同利益并非公意的构成者，而是其可能性条件：主权者的形成以个体使自己成为臣民的行为为条件。没有这界定了共同利益的行为，便没有主权者，从而没有公意。在何种意义上可谈卢梭的「功利主义」？功利出现在两种意义上：一、一能力惟有在有用时才发展，需要不能创造此能力，功利只充当能力的实现者；二、契约的共同利益是公意的可能性条件，而非其原则。

utif de in volonté gencrale, uais c'est sa condition de possibilit6 : in formation du souvorain a pour condition facto de 1'individu se faisant sujet. Sans cot acto, qui d^finit l' int;;r&t con_:un, it n'y aurait pas de souvorain, of done pas de volonté generale. En quel sons pout-on parlor d'un "utilitarisne" de Rousseau ? La notion .''utilc) apparaît en dcux sons - une fncult6 no se d evclopr.e qua si elle est utile. Le bosoin ost inca ,abl;; do Greer cotta: fncult6. L'utile no jouc quo le r8lo de realisatour de la facult6. l'inter5t conr.:un du contrat est condition do possibili- te, non princil.o do in volonté Cini;rale. DLLEUZE - fL'USSE11 U. - 24 - Quo vout in volontu n6rrl_ ? Bile t-rcuvo sc. condition Cans 1' c:i;alit6 do In condition de tous les sujots. Llle no pout 3tre c.utoruin6e par une irufc;rcnce . in cc sons, n' c;taat ' utar.-ir--^o 7nr nutro chose cju' elle, elie ost volont6 de li- bertu (:=cnt). L11. no out vouloir que in loi. La loi lc.isso ink't.;m.in6 le rapport aux individus. Elle no se spc- cifie quo par 1'oouvro du 16r;islntour. :,n elle-u@ne, ells n'est'que in fore .'o in volontu du sujet cont:o citcyen. Lettre 6 do in Monta- gno. Cf aussi Lettro La I:ercior Cc in Riviere c'e 1767 : it faut trouver uno for,-:c d.: ^cuv r.i :ent qui Li.:tto in loi au- c'essus de 1'honne. Livro III, Chnpit:o I du Contrat it faut distinguer c.eux choses : in question do savoir si in volont6 ;cut vouloir tells action (possibilit: :or-lc 'u 'Kant). C ' est un pouvoir 16gislatif ; de celle : pouv

The contract necessarily forms a general will, but common interes t and general will must not be confused. Common interest is that of the subject in relation to the sovereign. That which immediately returns with the act by which I constitute myself as subject, is the contract. Everyone has a similar interest, since they are subjected to an equal condition. Removing the equality destroys all common interest. I can only constitute myself as subject in relation to a sovereign of which the subject is member, with respect to individuals . From this point of view, everyone is a legislator. This time, it is no longer equality which is inferred, but freedom, as that which the sovereign wants with regard to individuals. The general will is the will of everyone as member of the sovereign, as citizen. ‘The common interest is what make s the will general ’. What does Rousseau want to say by this? The common interest is not constitutive of the general will, but is its condition of possibility: the formation of the sovereign has for its condition the act of the individual making itself subject. Without this act, which defined the common interest, no sovereign can be had, and therefore no general will. 43 Social Contract, final chapter. In what sense can we speak of a “utilitarianism” of Rousseau? The notion of utility appears in two senses: - A faculty only develops if it is useful. Need is incapable of creating this faculty. Utility only plays the part of realizer of the faculty. - The common interest of the contract is the condition of possibility, not the principle, of the general will.

公意在其条件中找见一切臣民条件之平等。它不能被一种偏好所规定。在此意义上，不被任何外物规定、而只被自身规定，它是自由的意志（如康德）。它只能欲求法。法把与个体的关系留作未定，只通过立法者的工作而被特定化；在自身中它只是作为公民的臣民之意志的形式。须区分两事：一、意志能否欲求此行为（康德的道德可能性）——这是立法权；二、我们能否、是否有能力完成它（康德的物理可能性）——这是行政权。为公理所规定，公意不考虑行为的物理可能性，而把它当作抽象的。义务关涉法。「法」一词只有在规定（prescriptive）意义上才可被严格使用。若义务的来源是我使自己成为臣民的行为，那么法就必须是公民法，它立于契约之中。但这回答足够吗？它意味着卢梭极大地批判了自然法模式。自然法是否准许不平等？卢梭不答，只说自然法概念充满谬误。然而有文本提及自然法高于契约：1758年10月信中，他承认主权者之上三种优越而独立的权威：上帝、自然法、荣誉；若有冲突，主权者须退让。等级：自然法（爱）、荣誉、上帝。《山中书简》第6函：须证明契约不违反自然法。《爱弥儿》卷二：「自然与现存秩序的永恒法则，对智者替代了实证法。」智者是从社会中抽身者。那么，契约既是派生公民法与义务的首要原则，又关联于更高的自然法实例，这如何可能？对卢梭，自然法批判有两义。第一针对古人（柏拉图、亚里士多德、斯多亚），对他们自然法即 recta ratio（正确理性）、事物与其恰当目的之相符；卢梭认为他们误用了「法」一词——他们理解的是自然加于自身的法，而非它颁定的法。对卢梭，法的概念不是自然存在之条件，而本质上是一种规定（prescription）。现代人理解了这规定性格：法是对一智能而自由之存在的规定性规则；自然法适用于这能接受规定的存在。在霍布斯处，自然状态不再是完善性之秩序，而是力、激情与冲动的体系；对一激情存在，法便成为反对它的义务，相应有自然权利。此结构之外又接合第二种：自然法，其驱动力是对暴力死亡的恐惧（它甚至是理性的原则）。法颁定一条无之便不能保全生命的规则；它只假言地规定：给出保全生命的手段，条件是他人也欲此法则。于是问题：如何使法具约束力？那发生于一切个体彼此订立契约、且首要地把其权力委托给不参与契约的主权者。由此自然法成为公民法。然依卢梭，现代人的错误在于把自然法置于自然状态中，在其中预设一已被赋予理性的存在（无法则便无理性）。卢梭接受法的规定性格，但现代人未看出它只是假言的。对卢梭，自然法不在自然状态中，因为它是从自然状态出发的虚拟之遗传发展；它预设社会，因为虚拟只在社会的客观环境中实现。例如正义感惟有在有用时才实现，而惟有有社会它才有用。但社会并非自然法发展之构成者。契约须关联于自然法。契约作为公民法的绝对基础，必须被引回自然法，因为它同时是全部的让渡与瞬时的归还；若它违反法，便自我摧毁。

ons-nous,avons-nousinpossibilit6dol'acconplir(possibilit.ph;si,uodt;Kant).Costunpouvoirexecutif.LavolontuE;6n6ralesec'•.6tc:r;inantparinloi,neconsid'erepasfactionCanss^possibilit6physique,uaisinconsid'erecomaeabstraite.hinloiestliceunoobli;;•ntion.Luriotloinopoute"trerigoureu-.seLtenteL;ployec_u'enunsonsp;rescriptif.Siinsourcedel'obli`ationest-fact,:parquoijemefaissujet,inloinopout8troquocivilo,ellsasonfondenentCanslecontrat.Est-ceunoruonsesuffisanto?Unetcller:ponseinpliquoraitqueRousseaucritiqueconsid6rableaent1'ideaincodedeloinaturelle.Coquiva:'nnscesons:leDiscourssurl'In6g;alit6.Est-ceque1'in6galit6estautoris6eparinloinaturelle?Rousseaunor6pondpashcottaquestiononc'isantqueleconceptdeloinaturelleestunconceptplaindocontra-sons.PourtantityadestextosouRousseauser::clanedoinloinatural-ledontitditqu'elleostsup6rioureaucontratlui-nine.-Lettrod'octobre1758:Iladucttroisautoritessup6rieuresetincl6poncantosdusouvorain:cellodoDieu,cellodeinloinaturel-le,colledo1'honnour.S'ilyaconflit,c'estausouvorainb.ce-der.Hiernrchia:loinaturelle(a--tour),honneur,Dieu,qu'onre-trouvedensInHot:vc:lleHclolse.(Lottresur1'honneurestBansinpartieI:lettrcc'.eSaint-Proux).-Lettre6doiniiontagno.:I1fautprouverquolecontratnestpascontrairecruxleisnnturclles.-Emile,livroII:"Losleisut::rnollosdi;innatureetdo1'ordreexistent.:llostionnentliouColeispositivesausage".Lesageestcoluiquis'ostsoustraitainsociété.CounontlcContrr.tost-ilunPrincipepreciorc.'oudcriver_tinloiciviloet1'obliC;ation,alorsqu'ilestaussirapport6auneplushauteinstance,inloinaturolle?DLL'LUZL-PUUI:^.;..b.--25-Cf;debutDiscoursstarits.Lacritiqueclaloinaturelle:cl.ezRousseauadouxsons-eilc::rte-.',r.bordcontra;los..ncions(Platon,Lristote,Stoïcions):inleinaturelleestpoureuxinrectaratio,c'estlaconforr.itcidosc::ososlourspropro:sfins.Rousseau:ilsoL:plcientatortloi.:otloi.Itsontendaiantparloi,unoloiquoinnctu_-cs'i::::poseitells-L.CLoetnonpasuneloi

qu'ellePrescrit.Crtocc-.,.cu;tO.lei,conest,sacuneconditiond'exis-tence;oinnc.tu-'--,cost(,r__^tiellerientuneperscription.(prefaceduDiscourssur1'Incalit:).LesIiodor:a.osoatccnpriscecaracti:reprcscriptif.LaloiestpoureuxrL,;;loproscritounCtreintellion_tetlibre.Laloinaturelles'appliquecote"trecapabledorecevoirdespres-criptions.yvecHOL3;S,1'";tctdonaturenestplusordredeperfections,naissystk.eC_oforcos,depassions,dor:obiles.Laloid•evientalors,pourcot3tro,assionnc,obligationquislyoppose.L'étatdonatureestsysti;r:edeforces,avecdesdroitsnaturelscorrospondants.Lcottestructure,unedeuxieaes'ajoute:cellodeinloinaturolla.Lon.obiledocotte1C,c'estincraintedoinWortviolentoquistlcPrinciper.r=cdelaraison.Laloi,rescritunoreglesanscluoijonopourraisconsorverr:avie.Laloinaturel-locupone.ntno:outprescrirecu'hypothctiqueuent:ellenodonnequoler,oyondeconservermavia,aconditionquolesautresveuil-lentaussiinloi.D'ouleprobl6ue:coouentrendreinloiobliga-toire?Colasefaitparcoquetouslesindividuscontractontentreeuxetsurtoutd:1l,,;uontleurspouvoirsaunsouverainquinopaz-ticipepasauContrat.Parlalaloinaturelledevientcivile.LetortdosiIodornes,selonRousseau:laloinaturelleestWisepareuxcansl'c;tatConature,ilssupposontdanscotétat,unêtrede-jac.oucc'oraison.(carpasdoraison,pasdeloi).Rousseauaccoptolocaractererrescri^tifcoinlei.daislesZIo-Cernesn'ontpasv:;onquoielleconsistaitpuisqu'ellenestqu'hypoth:;tiquo.PourRousseau,inloinaturellenestpasdans1'étatdonaturecarelleostund_^voloppcoent{;enutiquedovirtualit6sapartirde1'e-tat:'.enature.Cottaloinaturellesupposeinsociétéenccsonsquelesvirtuali-tusnosorcalisontquoCansdoscirconstancesobjectivesquisont:?anslcsocietc.Paroxcuple,lesentimentdojusticenoserealiseques'ilostutiloatitnoPestquos'ilyaunesocietc.Coponc'antinsocictc;nestpasconstitutivedud%voloppenentdelaloinaturelle.LeContratdoltCtrorapport6alaloinaturelle.Carlecontrat,fondooentabsoluCalaloicivilc.doit3treramencainloi

natu-rellecaritcastonur:otompscu'alic;nntiontotale,restitutioninstantanc;e.Slitcontreditinloi,itseC.etruit.DELEUZE-ROUSS';--U.-2v-I'Lc1oinlo'civilochezRousseau.Laloiestl'actomu^cedusouverain,l'expressiondirectodeinvolonté;er1Lrnlo.I1yaunodiff::rcncodonatureentrodccretQtlei.Laloivadutouttoes,elleconsidbrelessujotsoncorpsatlessituationscormoaLctraitcs.C'cstunactodosouverainete.Undccretnou;:auos,;orsonnes,consid'erelcssujotscomeparticu-liors,losactionsCoI'_Lieconcretc,s.Costunactedegouvernenent.Laloi1

Thegeneralwillfindsitsconditionintheequalityoftheconditionofallsubjects.Itcannotbedeterminedbyapreference.Inthissense,notbeingdeterminedbyanythingbutitself,itisthewilloffreedom(asinKant).Itcanonlywantthelaw.Thelawleavestherelationtoindividualsundetermined.Itisonlyspecifiedthroughtheworkofthelegislator.Initself,itisonlytheformofthewillofthesubjectascitizen44.Adistinctionmustbemadebetweentwothings45:-Thequestionofknowingwhetherthewillcanwantsuchaction(moralpossibilityofKant).Itisalegislativepower;-Concerningthat:canwe,havewethepossibilitytoaccomplishit(physicalpossibilityofKant).Itisanexecutivepower.Beingdeterminedbythelaw,thegeneralwilldoesnotconsideractioninitsphysicalpossibility,butconsidersitasabstract.Anobligationisrelatedtothelaw.Theword‘law’canonlybeemployedrigorouslyinaprescriptivesense.Ifthesourceoftheobligationisthe44Letter6,LettersfromtheMountain;cf.lettertoLeMercierdelaRivièrefrom1767:‘aformofgovernancemustbefoundwhichputsthelawaboveman’.45SocialContractbookIII,chapterI.actbywhichImakemyselfsubject,thenthelawmustbecivil,ithasitsfoundationinthecontract.Butissucharesponsesufficient?SucharesponsewillhaveimpliedthatRousseauconsiderablycritiquestheideainthemodeofnaturallaw46.Isinequalityauthorizedbynaturallaw?Rousseaudoesnotrespondtothisquestion,andsaysthattheconceptofnaturallawisaconceptfullofnonsense.NeverthelesstherearetextswhereRousseaumentionsthenaturallawandinwhichhesaysthatitissuperiortothecontractitself:-LetterofOctober1758:headmitsthreesuperiorandindependentauthoritiesoverthesovereign:thatofGod,thatofthenaturallaw,thatofhonor.Ifthereisaconflict,itisuptothesovereigntoyield.Hierarchy:naturallaw(love),honor,God47.-Letter6inFromtheMountain:itmustbeproventhatthecontractisnotcontrarytonaturallaws.-Emile,book2:‘…theeternallawsofnatureandtheexistingorder.Theytaketheplaceofpositivelawstothewiseman’.Thewisemanistheonewhohasextractedhimselffromsociety.Sohowisthe

Contractaprimaryprinciplefromwhichderivecivillawandtheobligation,whileitisalsorelatedtoahigherinstance,thenaturallaw48?ThecritiqueofthenaturallawhastwosenseswithRousseau.First,itbearsupontheAncients(Plato,Aristotle,Stoics),forwhomthenaturallawistherectaratio,theconformityofthingstotheirproperends.Rousseauarguesthattheyusedtheword‘law’wrongly.Bylawtheyunderstoodalawthatnatureimposesonitselfandnotalawthatitprescribes.ForRousseau,theconceptoflawis46ThishappensintheDiscourseonInequality.47AsfoundinTheNewHeloise;theletteronhonorisinpartI:letterfromSaint-Preux.48SeethebeginningoftheDiscourseonInequality.notaconditionofexistenceofnature,itisessentiallyaprescription49.TheModernshaveunderstoodthisprescriptivecharacter.Forthemthelawisaprescriptiveruleforanintelligentandfreebeing.Thenaturallawappliestothisbeingwhichiscapableofreceivingprescriptions.InHobbes,thestateofnatureisnolongertheorderofperfections,butasystemofforces,ofpassions,andofdrives.Forapassionatebeing,thelawthenbecomestheobligationwhichopposesit.Thestateofnatureisasystemofforces,withcorrespondingnaturalrights.Tothisstructure,asecondisjoined:thatofthenaturallaw.Thedrivingforceofthislawisthefearofviolentdeath,whichiseventheprincipleofreason.ThelawprescribesarulewithoutwhichIcouldnotpreservemylife.Thenaturallaw,however,canonlyprescribehypothetically:itonlygivesthemeanstopreservemylife,ontheconditionthattheotherswillalsowantthelaw.Whencetheproblem:howtorenderthelawobligatory?Thatcomestopassbecauseallindividualsmakecontractsamongthemselves,andabovealldelegatetheirpowerstoasovereignwhodoesnotparticipateintheContract.Becauseofthisthenaturallawbecomescivil.Now,themistakeoftheModerns,accordingtoRousseau,isthattheyputthenaturallawinthestateofnature,thattheypresupposeabeingalreadyendowedwithreasoninthisstate(becausenolawwithoutreason).Rousseauacceptstheprescriptivecharacterofthelaw,buttheModernshavenotseeninwhatitconsisted,

sinceitisonlyhypothetical.ForRousseau,thenaturallawisnotinthestateofnature,becauseitisageneticdevelopmentofvirtualitiesstartingfromthestateofnature.Thisnaturallawpresupposessocietyinthesensethatthevirtualitiesonlyrealizethemselvesunderobjectivecircumstanceswhichareinsociety.Forexample,thesentimentofjusticeonlyrealizesitselfifitisuseful,anditonlyis49SeetheprefaceoftheDiscourseonInequality.soifthereisasociety.However,societyisnotconstitutiveofthedevelopmentofthenaturallaw.Thecontractmustberelatedtothenaturallaw.Thecontract,theabsolutefoundationofcivillaw,mustbeledbacktothenaturallaw,becauseitisatthesametimetotalalienationandinstantaneousrestitution.Ifitcontradictsthelaw,itdestroysitself.

法是主权者的行为本身，是公意的直接表达。敕令（decree）与法之间有种类之别。法从一切到一切，把臣民当作身体、把情势当作抽象来考量——它是主权行为。敕令指派个人，把臣民当作特殊个体、把行为当作具体来考量——它是治理行为。法规定政府的形式，以及每一臣民总体上进入政府所须满足的条件。主权者是「共同的我」，是「被赋予感受性的生命」。公意：便是对应于这生命的运动。作为主权者与公意的形成，社会契约是主权者借以保存自身的形式。社会契约已然是公意；它规定一种形式的意志。契约自身经普遍化，把意志形式化。故主权者已然是一种形式的意志（而特殊意志总在搜寻偏好，公意才是真正的普遍：一前康德式的区分）。这普遍化不是特殊意志的相加。公意欲求什么？它所欲者须被普遍地、亦即形式地规定：平等与自由。主权者作为公意，就在它欲求自由与平等之际。法之形式意味着它从人、从它与人（敕令将处理之）的关系中抽象出来（在此意义上，政府是一种判断的能力：确定落入法下的个案）。然而，法若在其普遍规定意义上是形式的，它却又不是形式的，因为没有不规定平等与自由的法。最好的、良的法，例如，不能从与事物和对象的关系中抽象。对卢梭，那把我们从与人的关系中拯救出来的，始终是同事物的关系。故法除非考虑到一给定社会的客观情势（资源、人口等），便未被充分规定。法因从与人的关系抽象而是形式的，它不因不从与事物的关系抽象而是形式的。故要规定一法，公意并不足；意志的形式规定须结合一给定社会客观环境的内容。于是公意欲求善，却不知它（私人恰相反）。它因形式而是盲目的。故公意须诉诸一种惊人的知性（这是把一种能力心理学转置到社会层面）：即立法者，他从外部照亮意志。没有立法者，公意形式上知道它欲求什么，却需要他来被质料地规定。良法须不考虑特殊的人（形式面）又适应具体情势（质料面）。法故而是这样一种组合：一种指涉意志的形式，与一种指涉立法者的质料。正因如此，不可能有法从其形式而来的先验演绎。